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The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing Labor through NLRA Reform and Radical Workplace Relations 
Michael M. Oswalt 
michael.oswalt@law.duke.edu 
 
The seventieth anniversary of the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act1 (NLRA 
or Act) prompted renewed reflection on its viability to effectively govern relations between labor 
and management in the modern workplace.2  For supporters of the American labor movement, 
the occasion was not a cause for celebration.3  Although surveys showed that a clear majority of 
workers would vote for a union if an election were held in their workplace,4 by 2006 the 
percentage of private wage-earners in unions had shrunk to 7.4 percent,5 less than a third of the 
level reported in the early 1970s.6  That the statute valiantly proclaimed the protection of the 
                                                 
*JD, Duke University School of Law, expected May, 2008; MTS, Duke University School of 
Divinity, expected May, 2008; BA, Haverford College, 2000.  I am enormously grateful to 
Professor Catherine Fisk for her encouragement, guidance, and support of this paper from its 
earliest stages.  I am truly lucky to have her as an inspiration and an example.    
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000). 
2 See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, Forum: At 70, Should the National Labor Relations Act Be Retired?: 
NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223 (2005); 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 103, at A-1 (May 31, 2005) (reporting on the American Bar 
Association’s Section of Labor and Employment Law conference marking the seventieth year of 
the Act); Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act at Seventy: Rapidly Approaching 
Irrelevance, LERA, Fall, 2005, http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/Perspectives/onlinecompanion/. 
3 See, e.g., Jack Rasmus, Reorganizing American Labor, Z MAGAZINE, July-August, 2006, 
http://zmagsite.zmag.org/JulAug2006/rasmus0706.html (“At no time in the past 70 years have 
American workers and unions been under more direct and intense attack by corporate America.  
Moreover, that attack continues to show signs of becoming increasingly virulent and bold.”); 
Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act at Seventy: The Decline of Unionization and 
Collective Bargaining in America, LERA, Fall, 2005, 
http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/Perspectives/onlinecompanion/ (“There is little reason to 
celebrate. The NLRA no longer serves. . . its founding principles. . .70 years later, optimism has 
given way to cynicism and despair”). 
4 Labor Day 2005: The State of Working America, HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES TELEPHONE 
SURVEY (For the AFL-CIO), Aug. 2005, available at 
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/laborday/upload/ld2005_report.pdf. 
5 Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2006 (Jan. 25, 2007), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
6 Eduardo Porter, Unions Pay Dearly for Success, N.Y.TIMES, January 29, 2006, at D1. 
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right to self-organization to be the “policy of the United States”7 served only as a sardonic 
reminder of the gulf between the Act’s ideals and the everyday realities of union organizing.8  
Some called for various reforms of the Act,9 others for its repeal,10 while Jonathan Hiatt, AFL-
CIO General Counsel, simply wondered “how much of the Act would be left” by its seventy-fifth 
anniversary, given the rate at which long-standing labor law doctrines had been undermined by 
the National Labor Relations Board in just the previous twelve months.11 
 Yet, notwithstanding the diversity of thought regarding the usefulness or uselessness of 
traditional labor law to revive workplace democracy, the labor movement has largely coalesced 
around a legislative proposal to reform the NLRA, the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA).12  
                                                 
7 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). 
8 Representative, first-person accounts of the perils involved in organizing a union are 
powerfully presented in Some of Them Are Brave The Unfulfilled Promise of American Labor 
Law (Am. Rights at Work), 2003, http://www.americanrightsatwork.org. A comprehensive 
empirical discussion of the same phenomenon is outlined in Chirag Mehta & Nik Theodore, 
Undermining the Right to Organize: Employer Behavior During Union Organizing Campaigns 
(Ctr. for Urban Econ. Development, Univ. of Illinois at Chicago) Dec. 2005, available at 
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org. 
9 See, e.g., Dannin, supra note 2 (harnessing a novel litigation strategy to reinvigorate the 
enforcement powers of the NLRA); Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What 
Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C.L.REV. 125 (2003) (criticizing the Act and suggesting 
avenues for reform); Paul Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First 
Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177 (2001) (setting out various possible amendments to 
make the Act more favorable to workers seeking to form a union). 
10 See, e.g., Anton G. Hajjar & Daniel B. Smith, National Labor Relations Interference With 
Private Representation Agreements – Is Repeal of the National Labor Relations Act the Answer? 
(May 13, 2004)(Paper presented to the Pacific Coast Labor & Employment Law Conference) 
(considering the ramifications of repealing the Act); Rick Valliere, Organized Labor Would Fare 
Better Under State Labor Laws, Professor Says, LABOR RELATIONS WEEK, Jan. 19, 2006. And, 
to be sure, calls for repeal of the Act, even emanating from within the mainstream of the labor 
movement, were documented as long ago as the 1980s.  See Cathy Trost & Leanard M. Avcar, 
AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a Dead Letter, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8 (advocating 
repeal of the NLRA).   
11 Jonathan Hiatt, General Counsel, AFL-CIO, Address at the ABA Labor and Employment Law 
conference marking the seventieth anniversary of the Act: The NLRA at Seventy: The 
Immediate View (May, 2005). 
12 S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007). H.R. 800, 110th Cong.(2007). 
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EFCA is presently the centerpiece of the AFL-CIO’s Congressional lobbying efforts, occupying 
a prominent location on its website,13 and it is the subject of aggressive petition, email, and 
organizational endorsement campaigns.14   
It is also ambitious.  EFCA would eliminate the traditional secret-ballot NLRB election in 
favor of certifying a union pursuant to a Board finding that a majority of employees had signed 
authorizations designating the union as its bargaining representative.15  It would also provide for 
first contract mediation and arbitration if an employer and a union were unable to reach a 
contract agreement within ninety days.16  And it would increase the penalties assessed to 
employers who committed unfair labor practices against employees during a union campaign or 
first contract negotiation, including treble back pay, civil penalties, and a requirement that the 
NLRB seek a federal court injunction against an employer it finds has significantly interfered 
with employee rights during an organizing or first-contract campaign.17 
 Nonetheless, many doubt if NLRA reform beneficial to the labor movement is even 
possible, regardless of which party controls the White House or Congress.  In meticulously 
tracing the roots of what she terms the “ossification of labor law,” 18 New York University Law 
School Professor Cynthia Estlund notes that “for many decades, both organized labor and 
especially employers have had enough support in Congress to block any significant amendment 
                                                 
13 AFL-CIO, America’s Union Movement, http://www.aflcio.org (last visited Aug. 21, 2006). 
14 Employee Free Choice Act, http://www.aflcio.org/voiceatwork/joinaunion/efca (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2006). 
15 S. 1041, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (amending section 9(c) of the Act). H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 2 
(2007) (amending section 9(c) of the Act). 
16 S. 1041, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007) (amending section 8 of the Act). H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 3 
(2007) (amending section 8 of the Act). 
17 S. 1041, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007) (amending sections 10(1), 10(c), and 12 of the Act). H.R. 
800, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007) (amending sections 10(1), 10(c), and 12 of the Act). 
18 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1611 (2002) (noting a longstanding political impasse has blocked any major congressional 
revision of the NLRA since 1959). 
 4
that either group strongly opposes.”19  The bar for “enough support,” of course, is rather low: “it 
means a minority that is big enough, well organized enough, and committed enough to tie up a 
bill through the arcane supermajority requirements of the Senate.”20  That labor law reform 
proposals provoke such committed opposition leads Estlund somewhat drearily to conclude that 
labor’s best hope for change might be to rally public support for workers’ rights,21 eschewing 
labor law legislative efforts altogether.22  
A New Direction 
 The project of this Article is to argue that major NLRA reform—reform calculated to 
vivify the labor movement through revitalized organizing and internal activism—is possible.  
Central to this claim is that a grand compromise between entrenched labor and management 
interests can be reached, but only if the stakes are drastically raised.  Labor must receive what is 
central to its strategy and rhetoric, and business must receive what is central to its anti-union, 
free-market ideology.  The key is that the reform management believes would cripple the 
American labor movement is, in fact, vital to its survival.   
                                                 
19 Id. at 1540. 
20 Id.  Indeed, although in the newly Democratic 110th Congress EFCA passed the House with a 
sizable majority, its supporters failed to overcome a Senate filibuster.  Even so, President Bush 
promised to veto the legislation, a move Congress probably would not have been able to 
override.  Steven Greenhouse, Clash Nears in Senate on Legislation Helping Unions Organize, 
N.Y.TIMES, June 20, 2007, at A1; Steven Greenhouse, Senate Republicans Block Bill on 
Unionizing, N.Y.TIMES, June 27, 2007, at A1. 
21 Unfortunately, Estlund may not have considered well-documented evidence of bias in the 
media’s coverage of the labor movement, which might negatively affect labor’s ability to shape 
public consciousness.  See, e.g., Bradford Plumer, Production Values: Figuring out what’s 
wrong with the media’s coverage of organized labor, MOTHER JONES, Sep. 7, 2005 (citing 
empirical research suggesting that media coverage of strikes focuses primarily on how 
consumers will be affected by the labor disputes). 
22 Estlund, supra note 18, at 1611-12.   
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The grand bargain I propose amends the NLRA to abolish the secret ballot union election 
in favor of a universal “card-check” procedure,23 in exchange for nationalizing the so-called 
“right-to-work” regime currently in force in twenty-two states.  Both changes, as will be shown, 
are beneficial to labor. 
 Part I of this Article provides an overview of the benefits of card-check to workplace 
organizing efforts, showing why labor vigorously supports the procedure and management 
strenuously opposes it.  Part II briefly traces the history of right-to-work, some conventional 
research attesting to its deleterious effects on unions, and how the legal gulf between the right-to-
work and non-right-to-work models is less stark than is commonly presumed.  In Part III, legal, 
sociological, and political theory scholarship are used to argue that unions not only can survive 
in a right-to-work environment, they can thrive.  The “right-to-work” regime, counter-intuitively, 
does not necessarily weaken unions, but instead can strengthen them.    
PART I 
Card Check in Union Organizing 
 The phrase “card check” actually refers to a process whereby an employer promises to 
recognize a union as the exclusive bargaining representative if a majority of workers in a unit 
sign cards supporting unionization.24  Sometimes a card-check pact is coupled with a more 
general “neutrality agreement” or arrangement crafted by the union to ease employer opposition 
during the organizing drive.25  For instance, a neutrality agreement might require that the 
                                                 
23 A concept taken directly from section two of the Employee Free Choice Act.  See S.1041, 
110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (amending section 9(c) of the Act); H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) 
(amending section 9(c) of the Act). 
24 Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality 
Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 383 
(2001). 
25 Id. at 377. 
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employer not engage in certain speech or intimidation tactics while the union is collecting cards, 
or it might allow organizers greater access to the employer’s property than is legally 
compelled.26   
 That card check agreements, with or without a neutrality agreement, circumvent the 
traditional Board election does not detract from their legitimacy.27  Rather, consistent with 
NLRA aspirations promoting workplace cooperation and harmony,28 courts have consistently 
held that employers may voluntarily contract to recognize a union by means other than an 
election, including a specified majority of signed authorization cards.29  Indeed, when a card 
check agreement is signed and fully integrated, courts will enforce them against a recalcitrant  
employer.30 
 Recently, card check agreements have become the rule rather than the exception in 
organizing campaigns.31  In 2005, card check was the genesis for over seventy-percent of newly 
unionized workers, compared to just five percent in the mid-eighties.32   
                                                 
26 Id. at 380-84. The mere existence of a neutrality agreement does not foreclose the possibility 
of a traditional NLRB election. Like any contract, its content will vary by the parties’ intent, thus 
a union seeking to circumvent the Board would have to specifically negotiate a card check 
clause. See id. 
27 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596-97 (1969) (a union need not be certified 
as the winner of a Board election to become the exclusive bargaining representative). 
28 See NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401 (1952) (“The [National 
Labor Relations Act] is designed to promote industrial peace by encouraging the making of 
voluntary agreements governing relations between unions and employers.”). 
29 Card check arrangements have been uniformly endorsed by the Board and courts.  See, e.g., 
NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Broadmoor 
Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238, 241 (9th Cir. 1978); Terracon, Inc., 339 NLRB No. 35, slip op. at 5 
(2003), affd. 361 F.3d 395 (7th Cir. 2004); MGM Grand, 329 NLRB 464, 466 (1999). 
30 See, e.g., Snow & Sons, 134 NLRB 709, 710 (1961) (employer must honor the results of a 
card check agreement), enfd. 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962); Hotel & Restaurant Employees 
Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1993) (enforcing card check and 
neutrality agreement pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act). 
31 See, e.g., Rick Valliere, Unions Turning Away from NLRB Elections as Primary Way of 
Organizing, Raynor Says, LABOR RELATIONS WEEK, Jan. 19, 2006. 
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 The rationale behind unions’ increasing reluctance to engage the formal NLRB election 
process is captured succinctly by AFL-CIO lobbyist Andy Levin: “The NLRB election route is a 
death trap.”33  Though this is perhaps overstated, it is true that in representation elections 
overseen by the Board, employers frequently and aggressively partake in both legal and non-
legal anti-union tactics.  A report by the University of Illinois at Chicago’s Center for Urban 
Economic Development found that in the lead-up to NLRB elections, fifty-one percent of 
employers use bribery or favoritism to persuade workers to oppose the union, forty-nine percent 
threaten to close a worksite if the union prevails, ninety-one percent require employees to attend 
anti-union meetings with supervisors, and thirty percent fire workers allied with the union.34 
 In contrast, the likelihood and opportunity for management to intimidate and coerce is 
greatly lessened under the card check paradigm, especially when combined with an employer-
neutrality clause.35 As Stewart Acuff, the AFL-CIO’s Organizing Director explains: “We prefer 
card check because people can do it off premises, can do it in their homes, can do it without the 
employer looking over their shoulder.”36  Acuff’s anecdotal experiences are supported 
empirically.  Forty-six percent of workers involved in Board elections report having experienced 
employer coercion leading up to the vote, while only twenty-three percent of workers engaged in 
card check campaigns report that their supervisors pressured them not to sign authorization 
                                                                                                                                                             
32 Steven Greenhouse, Employers Sharply Criticize Shift in Unionizing Method to Card From 
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A1. 
33 George Raine, A high-stakes labor card game; Organizing strategy has hotel workers avoid 
secret ballot, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2006, at A1.  
34 Chirag Mehta & Nik Theodore, Undermining the Right to Organize: Employer Behavior 
During Union Representation Campaigns, (Ctr. for Urban Econ. Development, Univ. of Illinois 
at Chicago) Dec. 2005, available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org.  
35 Hartley, supra note 24, at 383 (citing a study suggesting enhanced organizing prospects when 
a neutrality agreement is combined with card check).   
36 Anya Sostek, Debate over union voting procedures may be topic at AFL-CIO meeting here, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 4, 2006, at A1. 
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cards.37  Probably in turn, unions are significantly more likely to prevail in card check campaigns 
than in Board sponsored elections.38   
Part of the proposal advanced here would remove card check from its current framework 
as an agreement between a union and employer and formalize it statutorily.  Tracking the 
language in EFCA, once the Board finds that a majority of employees in a bargaining unit have 
signed cards designating the union as their bargaining representative, the Board would be 
required to certify the union, avoiding the traditional election.   This aspect of the proposal is of 
clear benefit and interest to the labor movement.  The following section discusses a trade-off 
that, in response, would be of interest and presumed benefit to the business community, 
nationalized “right-to-work.” 
PART II 
Union Security and The Right-to-Work Regime 
 Union security “refers to an agreement between an employer and a union under which an 
employee must either join the union or satisfy a financial obligation to the union as a condition 
of employment.”39  The ultimate form of such security, where an employer agrees to hire only 
pre-existing union members,40 was lawful under section 8(3) of the NLRA up until 1947, when 
Congress revised the Act through the Taft-Hartley amendments.41   Taft-Hartley emerged partly 
                                                 
37 Fact Over Fiction: Opposition to Card Check Doesn’t Add Up, ISSUE BRIEF (Am. Right at 
Work, Washington, DC), Mar. 2006.   
38 Sostek, supra note 36, at A1 (“Unions are successful a little more than half the time in formal 
NLRB elections, versus nearly eighty percent with card check.”). 
39 LABOR UNION LAW AND REGULATION 423 (William W. Osborne, Jr. ed., 2003). 
40 Id. at 425 (“nothing in this Act…shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a 
labor organization…to require as a condition of employment membership therein”). 
41 Osborne, supra note 39, at 427. 
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in response to increasing attacks that this powerful arrangement, known as the closed shop, was a 
discriminatory barrier to free employment42 and threatened individual liberty.43   
But Congress also understood the union concern that, as explained by Senator Taft, “if 
there is not a closed shop those not in the union will get a free ride [while] the union does the 
work get[ting] the wages raised.”44  In turn, section 8(a)(3) of the amended Act continued to 
sanction union-management partnerships that, in more limited forms, sought to provide union 
security so that employees who “share [in] the benefits of what unions are able to accomplish 
though collective bargaining . . . pay their share of the cost.”45  For instance, “union shop” 
agreements, under which non-union members can obtain initial employment but must become 
members within a certain period of time, are allowed by section 8(a)(3).46   
 Yet in section 14(b), Congress also allowed states the power to restrict or prohibit union 
security agreements altogether,47 carving out an exception to the NLRA’s default preemption 
                                                 
42 See S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 6 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (1948) (“the closed shop and the abuses associated 
with it…create too great a barrier to free employment to be longer tolerated”); Osborne, supra 
note 39, at 426. 
43 The House Committee on Education and Labor stated rather hyperbolically that the American 
worker “has been cajoled, coerced, intimidated, and on many occasions beaten up, in the name of 
the splendid aims set forth in Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act.  His whole 
economic life has been subject to the complete domination and control of unregulated 
monopolies.” H. REP. NO. 80-245 (1947) reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (1948).    
44 Osborne, supra note 39, at 426; S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 6 (1947) reprinted in 1 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (1948). 
45 Osborne, supra note 39, at 426; NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 80-105, 1st Sess., at 6, LMRA LEG. HIST. 412). 
46 See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000) (“nothing in this Act…shall preclude an employer from making an 
agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein 
on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment”).   
47 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2000) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the 
execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a 
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is 
prohibited by State or Territorial law”).  The constitutionality of 14(b) was upheld in Lincoln 
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rule.48  Twenty-two states have exercised this power, and their resulting statutes make up what is 
colloquially known as the “right-to-work.”49  Although states differ in the extent to which they 
utilize 14(b) to restrict security agreements, as is noted by a prominent labor law treatise, “every 
state with a right-to-work law prohibits unions and employers from conditioning employment on 
any type of union ‘membership,’ even if a union has been chosen by a majority of employees as 
the exclusive bargaining representative.”50  In so doing, state right-to-work laws—either 
explicitly or as interpreted judicially—bar most union security agreements, including agency fee 
arrangements,51 which obligate nonmembers to pay the equivalent of union dues and fees for the 
union’s services.52   
 Those allied with the labor movement vigorously oppose the right-to-work regime.  At 
the state level, votes on right-to-work spur aggressive union counter-mobilizations,53 which often 
                                                                                                                                                             
Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) and Am. Fed’n of 
Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949). 
48 Osborne, supra note 39, at 516. 
49 The following states have enacted “right-to-work” provisions: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, and Wyoming.  Osborne, supra note 39, at 915.     
50 Id. at 518. 
51 See Osborne, supra note 39, at 518 (Except for seven states, all of the right-to-work states 
“expressly prohibit agreements conditioning employment on either membership or payment of 
dues or fees.  In six of the remaining states, the courts or the Attorney General have interpreted 
right-to-work laws to prohibit agency shop arrangements.”). 
52 See Motor Coach Employees v. Las Vegas Stage Line, 319 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1963) (“[An 
agency shop] agreement provides that employees who do not join the union will pay the regular 
initiation fee and dues to the union, and that if they do not make these payments, the employer 
will discharge them.”).  
53 See Working Families Celebrate Victory in New Hampshire, http://blog.aflcio.org/?p=303 
(Mar. 23, 2006, 15:57 EST) (“On March 22, after a working families’ mobilization plan that 
showed lawmakers just how deeply right-to-work laws go against the grain of New Hampshire 
voters, the latest RTW proposal again failed.”). 
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recast the legislation as the “right-to-work for less.”54  The modified moniker, in fact, references 
a phenomenon borne out by data.  The average worker in a right-to-work state earns $5,333 less 
annually than workers in other states.55  Moreover, an analysis of Census Bureau statistics has 
shown that both per capita income and union density are negatively correlated at statistically 
significant levels with right-to-work laws.56   
 Union hostility to “right-to-work” is not just a reaction to such points.  At a very basic 
level, the “right-to-work” paradigm is threatening to a movement that owes its existence to its 
ability to collect dues from its members.  It is assumed that where union security agreements 
exist, the union shop and a steady stream of weekly or bi-weekly dues follow.57  In contrast, 
where right-to-work reigns, the union shop is outlawed and free riders may flourish, enjoying the 
contractual benefits of union membership without actually paying for them.  Indeed, as the duty 
                                                 
54 THE TRUTH ABOUT RIGHT-TO-WORK FOR LESS, RIGHT-TO-WORK HURTS EVERYONE (2006), 
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/legislativealert/stateissues/upload/rtw.pdf.  President Harry Truman 
is quoted to have said: “You will find some people saying that they are for the so-called right-to-
work law, but they also believe in unions.  This is absurd.  It is like saying you are for 
motherhood but against children.” See Open Shops in the 21st Century Workplace: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations, 106th Cong. 4 (2000) (opening 
statement of Ranking Member Tim Roemer, quoting President Truman). 
55 See AVERAGE ANNUAL PAY FOR 2000 AND 2001 AND PERCENT CHANGE IN PAY FOR ALL 
COVERED WORKERS (2002), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/annpay.t01.htm (calculated by 
author).  
56 Raymond Hogler & Steven Shulman, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Right-to-work: 
Colorado’s Labor Peace Act and Its Implications for Public Policy, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 
927-28 (1999). 
57 There is, however, an intermediate step.  Section 302(c)(4) of the NLRA sanctions an 
arrangement called “checkoff,” where an employer will automatically deduct from an 
employee’s pay the dues owed to the union and transfer the dues directly to the union. LABOR 
UNION LAW AND REGULATION 530 (William W. Osborne, Jr. ed., 2003).  Thus, while “union 
security” refers to an employer-union agreement to ensure workers pay dues as a condition of 
employment, “checkoff” is a means of facilitating such payments. Id. at 531. Since the 
agreements are separate, a union may have a security agreement without checkoff, or even 
checkoff without union security. Id.  Unions in non-right-to-work states, of course, will attempt 
to negotiate for both union security and check-off, ensuring a constant and efficient flow of dues 
to the union each pay period.  
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of fair representation58 is owed to all union-represented employees, including nonmembers, 
unions must expend resources advocating for individual nonmembers but are prohibited from 
charging for those services.59   
 Yet, after granting the unique budgetary constraints faced by unions in right-to-work 
states, it is worth considering that labor’s troubles there60 cannot be blamed entirely on section 
14(a).  Given a number of judicial interpretations, union security is simply never complete, no 
matter the state.  For example, even the vaunted “union shop” agreement, which ensures full 
membership, provides only partial security.  That is because “membership” has been interpreted 
narrowly, requiring employees to satisfy certain financial obligations to the union like basic dues 
and initiation fees, but not requiring them to join61 or support the union’s political efforts, 
external organizing ventures, or any other activities unrelated to “bargaining, contract 
                                                 
58 This duty permits employees to challenge the quality of their union representation under a 
common law standard of “basic adequacy.” Osborne, supra, note 39, at 281.  As such, the union 
may not discriminate against the members or nonmembers it represents.  Steele v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). 
59 See Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 319 (1953) (explaining that by requiring a fee from a 
nonmember in a right-to-work state, “for services which are due the [employee] as a matter of 
right . . . the [union] has, in effect, taken the position that it will only represent its members in the 
important area of contract administration,” thereby unlawfully discriminating against the 
nonmembers). Cf. Cone v. Nevada Service Employees Local 1107, 998 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Nev. 
2000) (holding that a union’s practice of “charging nonmembers fees for individual [grievance] 
representation” did not violate Nevada’s right-to-work laws because the state statute explicitly 
authorized nonunion members to act on their own behalf and pay for their own representation). 
60 For 2005, the five states with the lowest levels of unionization were right-to-work states: 
Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia.  See Press Release, supra note 5.  
For a detailed history of labor’s decline and weakness in the right-to-work states, see Raymond 
Hogler, The Historical Misconception of Right-to-work Laws in the United States: Senator 
Robert Wagner, Legal Policy, and the Decline of American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 101 (2005).   
61 See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (“It is permissible to condition 
employment upon membership, but membership, insofar as it has significance to employment 
rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues.  “Membership” as a 
condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core.”). 
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administration, or grievance adjustment.”62   Thus, though the union shop assures a minimum 
financial infusion each month, dollars can fluctuate as members join or drop out, just like under 
the right-to-work regime.  In turn, the union must still service its “members” to avoid apathy, 
justify external organizing and political lobbying expenses, and stave off decertification efforts.   
 Every union, right-to-work or not, must therefore navigate economic trade-offs.  It is true 
that a union in a right-to-work state must compensate for the possibility of a more precipitous 
drop in resources, but it is equally true that as that same union approaches the vigor of full 
membership, differences between it and a union in a non-right-to-work state become almost 
wholly rhetorical.63  A strong union, one might say, is a strong union in any state.   
In all, right-to-work laws surely affect unions’ fortunes in tangible ways.  But to attribute 
labor’s difficulties in right to work states solely or even primarily to section 14(a) may be 
simplistic.   
Part III 
 Yet this Article’s challenge is not to show that right-to-work’s negative impact on unions 
is overstated or does not really exist, but rather to argue that when properly oriented, unions can 
prosper in a right-to-work environment. Indeed, right-to-work can be beneficial.  And because 
right-to-work is perceived to weaken unions and nicely complements business’s free-market 
schema, labor’s embrace of it could expose a rare space for legislative reform, allowing unions to 
                                                 
62 Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 738 (1988). 
63 See, e.g., James W. Kuhn, Right-to-Work Laws – Symbols or Substance?, 14 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 587, 588 (1961) (“If all workers within a bargaining unit always sought membership 
and willingly paid their dues, right-to-work laws could have little significance for collective 
bargaining.”). 
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gain what all agree is obviously to their benefit, card-check.64  Part III will thus attempt to 
demonstrate both that unions can thrive in a right-to-work setting and that the legal regime itself 
can facilitate stronger unions.  
Defying Assumptions in the Right-to-Work Setting 
 Amid conspicuously low unionization rates in right to work states65 there are unions that 
defy conventional wisdom66 and function well even in the absence of union security.  Right-to-
work Nevada boasts one of the highest unionization rates in the nation, equal to the rate in 
Pennsylvania, higher than the rate in Maryland, and a shade below the rate in Massachusetts, 
three states that allow for the union shop.67  Overall, Nevada’s unions represent 158,000 workers, 
ninety-two percent of whom voluntarily retain their union membership.68   In fact, Culinary 
Workers Local 226, the Las Vegas hotel local of UNITE HERE, is the largest and fastest-
growing local union in the United States, having doubled its membership since the 1980s even as 
hotel union membership declined nationally.69  United Electrical (UE) Local 1111, though 
                                                 
64 This proposal also has a certain inherent logic.  Many would probably concede that in an ideal 
system of labor-management relations, those wanting union representation should be able to 
achieve that goal efficiently, while those who do not should not be forced to pay for it.  
65 See Press Release, supra note 5.   
66 See, e.g., BARBARA S. GRIFFITH, THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN LABOR: OPERATION DIXIE AND THE 
DEFEAT OF THE CIO (1988) (concluding that the failed results of “Operation Dixie,” the CIO’s 
attempt to organize the southern right-to-work states en masse in the late 1940s, was inevitable). 
67 In 2005, 13.8 percent of Nevada’s workers were unionized, compared to 13.3 percent in 
Maryland, and 13.9 percent in Massachusetts.  See Press Release, supra note 5.   
68 In 2005, 145,000 of Nevada’s workers who were represented by unions maintained their 
membership.  See Press Release, supra note 5.   
69 Harold Meyerson, Las Vegas as a Workers’ Paradise, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2004; 
Employment and Labor Relations in Nevada, JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY FORUM ON THE LEADING 
SOCIAL INDICATORS IN NEVADA (Social Health of Nevada Report, Las Vegas, NV), Nov. 5, 
2004, available at http://www.unlv.edu/centers/cdclv/healthnv/labor.html. 
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located in non-right-to-work Wisconsin, chooses not to bargain for union security yet presently 
maintains ninety-seven percent membership.70   
 What accounts for such anomalies? The robustness of unions like Local 226 in Nevada 
and Local 1111 in Wisconsin could be a result of a conscious tendency towards internal activism, 
a trait some have suggested is critical to interior union strength.  As labor journalist Abe Raskin 
once opined, “reorganizing the organized must transcend all other union priorities . . . without 
internal revival, all of labor’s other good intentions will falter and probably fail.”71   
Sure enough, Local 226’s resurgence—in the mid-1980s six hotels decertified from the 
union and the union’s health-care plan approached bankruptcy—coincided with the arrival of 
John Wilhelm, who had recently orchestrated a successful union drive at Yale University using a 
novel approach: allowing the workers to act as organizers.72  Wilhelm brought this model to Las 
Vegas, instituting workers’ committees empowered to organize street rallies and union events 
without major interference from paid staff.73  With this new sense of purpose, the committees 
turned militant, culminating with a strike at the Horseshoe Casino in 1989 that led to hundreds of 
arrests.74  In preparation for the 2002 contract negotiations, the committees organized a rally at 
Las Vegas’ Sports Arena attended by over 23,000 local members.75  Local 1111, for its part, 
attributes high membership rates to a “constant shop-floor presence . . . on the lookout for young 
workers willing to stand up to management . . . send[ing] them to its shop steward training 
                                                 
70 United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America (UE) Local 1111, 
http://www.ue1111.org/whoweare.htm. 
71 A.H. Raskin, New Directions for the AFL-CIO, NEW MANAGEMENT, Winter, 1986, at 12-13. 
72 Meyerson, supra note 69. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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program to develop their ability to be an effective voice for their co-workers.”76  And Tom 
Wetzel, who has conducted hundreds of interviews with union workers in the right-to-work state 
of Iowa, reports that strong membership there is buoyed by peer pressure on the shop floor:  “If a 
worker refused to join the union, co-workers would refuse to lend him or her [tools] or do other 
favors that make life on the job more bearable.  The attitude was: ‘If you won’t support us, 
you’re on your own, Jack.  But if you do support us, we’ll watch your back.”77 
Business Unionism and its Evolution 
  Of course, just because certain unions have found some success in the right-to-work 
environment using tactics a few theorize should indeed be helpful does not mean that the 
experiences of, for example, Local 226 can be replicated nationally, or even anywhere else.  
In fact, so-called “labor realists” disparage attempts at internal organizing as circular efforts that 
merely re-activate the already activated.78  Members, it is argued, receive the quality of unionism 
they demand and little can be done to alter their levels of involvement.79    
Such thinking may have helped to usher in the era of “business unionism” in the 1970s 
and 1980s, whereby unions hoped to parry business animus and reverse shrinking rolls80 by 
adopting less activist and more conciliatory postures.81  The approach, it was thought, would 
                                                 
76 Tom Wetzel, Unionism and Workers’ Liberation, Z MAGAZINE, May 31, 2006. 
77 Id. 
78 ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, ROBUST UNIONISM 101-109 (1991). 
79 Id. at 101. 
80 In 1972 AFL-CIO President George Meany astonishingly remarked: “Why should we worry 
about organizing . . . Frankly, I used to worry about the membership, the size of the membership.  
But quite a few years ago, I just stopped worrying about it, because to me, it doesn’t make any 
difference.” RICK FANTASIA & KIM VOSS, HARD WORK 125 (2004). 
81 As Ian Robinson described the strategy: “[U]nions would downplay their adversarial traditions 
and become partners in the intensifying international competitive struggle.  Labor’s contribution 
to this partnership would be greater flexibility in workplace organization, and more positively, 
the encouragement of productivity-enhancing employee voice.” Ian Robinson, Neoliberal 
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both ease employer opposition to labor law reform and lead them to recognize that increased 
productivity and efficiency could best be achieved through cooperation with labor.82   
The strategy failed.  Rather than join with unions, employers simply avoided them, a 
choice that seemed to guarantee higher profits without the inconvenience of partnership.83  In 
response, instead of reversing course, many unions quixotically adopted an even less activist 
stance, muting external organizing efforts,84 discouraging rank-and-file participation in existing 
unions, and fostering workers’ dependence on professional union staff.85  Workers, in turn, 
began to view unions as a service they might consider purchasing, as opposed to a collective 
movement they might join.86   
 But as sociologists observed that organized labor had become more like an 
institutionalized interest group than a movement, some unions began to change.87  Shifting away 
from the failed values of business unionism, activists sought to transform the goals and tactics of 
organizing, as well as the roles of current union members.88  Campaigns would treat unions not 
as a commodity to be sold, but as a vehicle for solidarity in service to collective action in the 
workplace and in society.89  This would require radically new levels of commitment, courage, 
and participation by current members, who needed to be schooled in methods of direct action and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Restructuring and U.S. Unions: Toward Social Movement Unionism?, 26 CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 
127 (2000). 
82 STEVEN H. LOPEZ, REORGANIZING THE RUST BELT 4 (2004). 
83 Id. at 5.  
84 The United Auto Workers, for example, shunned new, non-union auto parts contractors, and 
local officials of the United Food and Commercial Workers reshaped their jurisdictional 
boundaries so that they could discontinue organizing department stores. RICK FANTASIA & KIM 
VOSS, HARD WORK 125 (2004).   
85 LOPEZ, supra note 82, at 59.  
86 Id. 
87 Kim Voss & Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in 
the American Labor Movement, 106 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 303, 304 (2000). 
88 Id. at 312-13. 
89 RICK FANTASIA & KIM VOSS, HARD WORK 127 (2004).   
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remolded in the ethics of community-mindedness and movement politics.90  Dubbed “social 
movement unionism,” the new philosophy would also rely on “corporate” or “comprehensive” 
campaigns, which try to turn a company’s social network of customers, investors, Board 
members, and even religious allies against it by unearthing and publicizing embarrassing or 
hypocritical corporate facts and practices.91  Social movement unionism additionally attempts to 
expand the arena of conflict into the greater community and society, often linking an organizing 
campaign at a particular firm to a social justice issue generally.92  Surprising, creative, and 
multiple tactics are also emphasized; in fact, the “card-check” innovation itself sprang from the 
experimentalism fostered by social movement unionism, and today comprehensive campaigns 
are ubiquitously coupled with demands for card-check agreements.93 
 The Service Employees International Union’s (SEIU) “Justice for Janitors” (J for J) 
campaign in Los Angeles is probably the paradigmatic example social movement unionism.94  
Combining shrewd corporate research,95 the media, and escalating guerilla tactics ranging from 
health and safety inspections to street theater to outright trespass,96 J for J showcased a torrent of 
                                                 
90 Id. at 127-28. 
91 Id. at 128-29. 
92 Id. at 129-31. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 134.  
95 SEIU initially hired a full-time researcher assigned the sole task of uncovering the ownership 
and management architecture of Los Angeles commercial cleaning companies.  Later projects 
revealed that the salient industry power-brokers were not small sub-contractors, but large 
international corporations, which were much more vulnerable to public opinion and social 
disruption.  Id. at 139-40.  
96 As portrayed in the movie “Bread and Roses” starring Adrien Brody and directed by Ken 
Loach, janitors cleaned a mock office in the middle of rush-hour, shutting down traffic. BREAD 
AND ROSES (Alta Films S.A. 2000).  The J for J campaign also engaged in “shaming rituals,” for 
instance, crashing high-level business meetings, chanting loudly, and throwing bags of trash 
around the room. RICK FANTASIA & KIM VOSS, HARD WORK 142 (2004). 
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public support and collective activism unseen since the 1930s.97  In just two years, J for J helped 
ninety percent of Los Angeles’s high-rise janitors gain the wages and benefits of a collectively 
bargained agreement.98  Perhaps J for J’s greatest accomplishment, however, was in allowing 
space for an unprecedented level of activism by the janitors themselves.  As summarized by 
sociologists Rick Fantasia and Kim Voss:  
“[T]he campaign uncovered unexpected levels of solidarity and daring on the part 
of Los Angeles’s immigrant janitors.  Far from being the docile wage slaves that 
many union officials predicted and that employers smugly expected, immigrant 
janitors proved to be quite militant, capable of quickly marshalling support not 
only among their fellow janitors but also among family, friends, and neighbors.  
Everyone, from employer-side lawyers to old-guard officials to the J for J staff, 
was astonished at these workers’ willingness to overtake the paid J for J staff 
members in their intensity and commitment.”99 
 
 Fresh from J for J and other similarly successful campaigns, SEIU quickly grew 
dissatisfied by the AFL-CIO’s lack of financial and strategic commitment to new organizing 
ventures, leading SEIU and seven other unions to break away and form a new federation called 
“Change to Win,” which the unions claimed would embody an even more aggressive and 
worker-fueled approach to organizing.100   
Social Movement Unionism: Implications for the Right-to-Work Setting 
 The advent of Change to Win, the massive import placed on card-check agreements,101 
and the demonstrated success of social movement unionism102 might portend a turning point in 
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99 Id. at 144-45.  
100 Steven Greenhouse, Breakaway Unions Start a New Federation, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 28, 2005, 
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campaign. See David Moberg, Paradigm Shift, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 2006, at 41 (“unions are 
changing the model for winning recognition . . . by using direct action to gain employer 
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American labor organizing.  The retreat from the conciliatory, professionalized ethic of business 
unionism may be complete, while the shift towards the creative, adversarial, and amateurized 
philosophy of social movement unionism may be total.103 
 If so, there are crucial implications relating to unions’ ability to survive in the right-to-
work environment.  Stemming from sociologist Erving Goffman’s hypothesis that the levels and 
forms of participation in organizational structures can instigate or hinder levels of activism in 
other organizations later,104 Linda Markowitz has studied how organizing strategies influence 
workers after campaigns end.105  Markowitz closely followed two successful organizing 
campaigns.106  One, at Geofelt Manufacturing, trained workers in organizing techniques and 
encouraged their participation in the drive, and the other, at Bob’s Grocery Stores, relied 
primarily on paid union staff to stage the campaign.107  Both campaigns then sharply restricted 
worker participation in the protracted contract negotiations that followed.108   
                                                                                                                                                             
102 See, e.g., Robert Bussel, Southern Organizing in the Post-Civil Rights Era: The Case of S. 
Lichtenberg 52 INDUS. & LABOR RELATIONS REV. 528 (1999) (use of comprehensive campaign 
tactics including gathering support of the local faith community, training workers to use 
collective power, and broadening the campaign to encompass issues of gender inequality led to 
the union’s victory after two earlier campaigns, which did not utilize such a comprehensive 
strategy, were defeated); Paul Jarley & Cheryl L. Maranto, Union Corporate Campaigns: An 
Assessment, INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 505 (1990) (corporate campaign tactics present a serious 
new challenge to employers). 
103 See generally BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE: A 
LABOR PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN BUSINESS (1992) (citing a current in the labor movement 
pushing unions to become more participatory with respect to their members).  
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105 See generally LINDA MARKOWITZ, WORKER ACTIVISM AFTER SUCCESSFUL UNION 
ORGANIZING (2000). 
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Workers at Bob’s reported feelings of dissatisfaction with the union and a generalized 
helplessness during the talks.109  Lacking the experiences and training that might have been 
assimilated through active organizing, the workers foundered, trading agency for marginalization 
by failing to learn about their rights and neglecting opportunities to push for change within the 
union or company.110  Half reasoned against participation by anemically asserting that   
“activism was not part of their role as a ‘union member.’”111  Explained one worker: “I don’t 
need to become involved.  We pay people to do that. . . If they’re doing their jobs, I shouldn’t 
have to participate.”112   
Workers at Geofelt were similarly frustrated that the union had excluded them from 
contract talks, but responded quite differently.113  Five workers who had been extremely active in 
the organizing campaign formed an informal committee to persuade co-workers that the union 
was “untrustworthy” and had abandoned them.114  The committee decided to try to replace the 
union with a rival, going so far as to research the official decertification process with the 
National Labor Relations Board.115  Markowitz stresses that “what is notable is that the action 
these employees took to redress their dissatisfaction imitated the action they had engaged in to 
create a union.  Because they had learned only the specific skills associated with conducting an 
organizing drive, they began another organizing campaign to replace the union.”116  That is, 
workers used the skills they had been taught. 
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 Markowitz’s research would seem to refute the labor realist perspective that levels of 
union member activism are indigenous and immune to manipulation.  Instead, it may be that in 
workers’ minds, the meanings and expectations of union membership are not predetermined but 
evolve through experience.117  If so, the activism and collective spirit of Nevada’s Local 226 is 
not anomalous but could be replicated elsewhere, the burgeoning social justice unionism model 
exemplified by J for J is not just an effective campaign strategy but a blue-print for union 
strength in the post-contract period, and innovators like Jennifer Gordon, whose “Workplace 
Project” conditions legal services on participation in organizing activities118 are shaping a 
consciousness that could undergird a new brand of internal unionism.  In short, unions can 
survive in the right-to-work setting.  Some already do.  And on their heels a new generation of 
members, molded by the efforts of social movement unionism, is primed to embody the activist 
spirit essential to union life in a post-union security world.  
The Union Benefits of Right-to-Work 
 Having suggested that the presence of a vibrant membership undermines the conventional 
presumption that right-to-work necessarily saps union strength, the remainder of Part III attempts 
to show that the right-to-work setting can actually benefit the labor movement.   
Suppressed Activism and the Core of the Union Shop 
 Labor’s allies have not always viewed union security agreements as desirable to the 
movement. Samuel Gompers himself is widely quoted to have said that “the workers in America 
adhere to voluntary institutions in preference to compulsory systems which are not only 
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impractical but a menace to their welfare and their liberty.”119  And even the most ardent unionist 
might secretly concede Selwyn Torff’s observation that “there is something disquieting about 
any organization that demands the law give it the right to compel where it has failed to 
persuade.”120 
 Today, the few who believe that labor would be strengthened by abandoning union 
security argue that the agreements foster a detached leadership out of touch with the 
membership.  This is the view of U.S. Representative Bob Goodlatte of Virginia: “[U]nions are 
alive and well in right-to-work states, but there is a very significant difference that I argue 
improves the unions . . . if members aren’t satisfied, they can vote with their feet and walk away . 
. . it makes the leadership of the union more responsive to the members.”121 
Indeed, simple logic suggests that when dues are guaranteed, attentive member servicing 
may not be,122 cultivating a frustrated and apathetic rank and file.  The right-to-work 
environment, alternatively, stands in sharp relief.  Where dues are linked to member satisfaction, 
leadership’s responsiveness embodies a special urgency, 123 as intimated by Representative 
Goodlatte and as portrayed by labor historians like Nelson Litchenstein who describes 1930s 
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unionism, which lacked union security entirely, as bustling with internal activism: “Everyday, 
local leaders faced the task of justifying the union’s existence to the rank and file to retain their 
loyalty. . . Grievance battles were the order of the day, and local officers went about their jobs in 
an aggressive and energetic manner.”124  From the individual member’s perspective, this 
servicing incentive might be viewed as an advantage of the right-to-work regime.  From the 
union’s perspective, it might not be.    
  The union might be wrong.  Servicing indeed imposes administrative costs and burdens, 
which may be higher in right-to-work states as unions try to enhance worker satisfaction and 
minimize free-riding.  Such added costs are often cited as evidence that the right-to-work model 
hurts unions.125  But the servicing and the interactions it spurs could also be viewed as an 
opportunity, and here radical democratic theory is instructive.  
The Radical Opportunities of Member Servicing 
 Political theorists have long identified a progressive atrophy in Americans’ civic and 
political engagement.126  But according to Princeton theorist Jeffrey Stout, if the rise of such 
arms-length democracy has an antidote, it is embedded in the honesty of a decentralized, face-to-
face conversation.  Indeed, for Stout, democratic activism resides in the “continuing social 
process of holding one another responsible . . .the practice of giving and asking for ethical 
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reasons.”127  In Stout’s terms, a political culture that restricts democratic practice to passive 
acceptance of shallow sound-bytes and a trip to the voting booth every two to four years breeds 
detachment and apathy, while scattered, impromptu, informal, reasoned conversations energize 
civic activity:  
“The social practices that matter most directly to democracy, as I have argued at 
length, are the discursive practices of ethical deliberation and political debate.  
The discursive exchange essential to democracy is likely to thrive only where 
individuals identify to some significant extent with a community of reason-givers.  
At the local level, this may be the community constituted by arguments over who 
does the dishes, what to do with the garbage we produce, how the police are 
behaving, and what should be covered in a high school curriculum.”128   
 
Thus for Stout, the true democratic activist is marked less by an interest in cable news and more 
by habits, dispositions, and practices that tend toward close relations with others, are spread 
neighbor to neighbor, and are imbued by an immediate culture that questions reality and 
demands explanation—even if the question is why is it always my turn to pick up the kids.   
 Stout’s prescription for civic engagement is familiar to those experienced in community 
organizing, where face-to-face encounters form the foundation for collective action and power.   
Indeed, Edward Chambers, Executive Director of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), the 
most prominent community organizing network in the nation, has called the “relational meeting” 
the “most radical thing [we] do.”129  In IAF parlance, “relational meeting” is a technical term for 
building relationships, which leads to issue targets and the identification of indigenous leaders.130   
Before an IAF organization even formally exists, organizers and initial leaders conduct up to ten-
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thousand of such meetings over three to four years.131  A skilled organizer uses a relational 
meeting not to sell or push an issue, but to listen and ask short succinct questions in hopes of 
eliciting anecdotes and personal narratives, which reveal the underpinnings of one’s motivation 
or lack of motivation.132  Chambers explains:  
“The relational meeting is the entry point to public life . . .[it] isn’t chitchat, like 
the usual informal exchange over coffee or drinks.  In causal meetings, we take 
people as they present themselves. We don’t push. We don’t dig. We don’t ask 
why or where a notion came from. We don’t probe an idea.  We don’t raise 
possibilities.  We don’t ask questions that engage the imagination: “Well, what if 
you looked at it this way?” “How would your parents have reacted?” “How would 
you feel if you were the other person?”. . .[the relational meeting] is an attempt to 
find the other’s center . . .Stories don’t rest on the surface, to be picked up in 
casual chatter.  Only concerted and intentional encounters will bring them to 
light.”133   
 
Mark Warren, an anthropologist at Fordham University who has studied the IAF method 
extensively, concludes that relational meetings work for IAF because “it is in community 
connections that individuals can develop the will to act collectively.”134  Moreover, “when 
people are placed in interdependent situations where they believe that they need each other, they 
forego initial prejudices and enact cross-ethnic and cross-racial helping.”  The “challenge,” he 
argues, “is to create these interdependent and cooperative forms.”135 
 The American workplace is well-suited to Warren’s challenge because such an 
interdependent cooperative form already exists: the labor union.  The acute goal, then, is to 
reorient labor to use IAF-type relational tactics internally, which political theory suggests and 
community organizing shows can incite individuals’ mobilization and create opportunities for 
collective action.  In short, unions must be transformed into what Stout terms a “community of 
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reason-givers,” with members and officials discussing internal union matters honestly, seriously, 
and often.    
The rise of social movement unionism, in combination with Markowitz’s research, 
suggests that the newest generation of union members may be especially receptive to internal 
relational tactics.  But member receptivity may not be enough.  Union officials may need to be 
compelled to initiate relational contact in the vein of radical democratic theory and IAF practice.   
Nationalized right-to-work might obligate just such a commitment.  Right-to-work at a 
national level, when viewed not as a demoralizing drain on resources but as an opportunity for 
relation-renewal, could drastically reframe the consciousness of union officials and the implicit 
expectations of union membership.  The tactics used and the culture shaped by Las Vegas’s 
Local 226 and UE Local 1111 would no longer be anomalous, but the rule.  National right-to-
work would institutionalize interior relation-building, which would institutionalize interior 
activism, which would institutionalize stronger unions.136  
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Ultimately, I speculate that the short-term costs of internal union reform would be outweighed by 
the long-term benefit of hundreds of newly responsive unions and millions of newly activist and 
radicalized unionists.  
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UPS Teamsters 
 The union culture at the United Parcel Service (UPS) exemplifies this progression well.  
UPS is a large global company with a unionized workforce that spans right-to-work and union 
security states alike.137 As Harvard public policy professor Robert Putnam, who has studied 
UPS’s employee culture has observed, “UPS exemplifies relational work.”138  Putnam’s word 
choice is deliberate.  “Relational work” is a technical reference to IAF organizing philosophy.  
Indeed, Putnam compares UPS union practices to the community organizing techniques 
employed successfully by Valley Interfaith, the IAF affiliate in southern Texas.139  For UPS 
Teamsters, face-to-face conversation is expected and institutionalized: 
“Every morning, in every UPS hub and center, drivers gather for a brief 
prework communication meeting, or PCM, before they go out on the road.  Every 
day, all around the country, drivers meet at lunchtime in parks and parking lots to 
talk, mixing social conversation with work: veterans help newcomers find obscure 
addresses or solve other problems; the drivers exchange missorted packages or 
balance their remaining loads to make sure everything gets delivered on time . . . 
A lot of conversation takes the form of storytelling . . .Veteran drivers recount 
tales of their early difficulties to encourage newcomers and to communicate some 
of the tricks of the trade.  They also recall the veterans who shared stories with 
them when they were new: The tales, for instance, of winter deliveries in rural 
Wisconsin that includes tips for preventing ice from forming on the steering 
wheel and how you are likely to find your farmer-customers at different places, 
depending on the weather.”140 
 
Such relational work has led to what Putnam describes as an almost unprecedented 
culture of internal cohesion: “Tales of cooperation are part of the company’s folklore . . .the 
brown worn by every driver represents membership in a collective enterprise, commonality over 
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individuality.”141  In turn, as IAF philosophy and radical democratic theory predicts, internal 
relation-building has catalyzed external and internal activism at UPS.  Putnam quotes Linda 
Kaboolian, a labor relations expert specializing in the history of the Teamsters: “employee 
groups and union locals are very active in civic life — there is a real occupational community 
among UPS workers.  Historically, there has been more union democracy and less corruption in 
UPS locals than in other parts of the Teamsters.”142   
There is probably no better portrayal of how internal relation-building, sparking activism, 
translates into union strength than the 1997 national UPS Teamsters strike.  The catalyst for the 
strike itself was a testament to the unity and selflessness of UPS union members across the 
country, as full-time workers stood with their colleagues not over an issue central to their own 
work-life, but to demand that UPS improve the lives of part-timers by converting them to full-
time.143  With the strike fund nearly empty and facing one of the largest and most profitable 
employers in the country, business analysts predicted the union’s collapse.144    
But with an already united and activist workforce schooled in the fundamentals of 
relational organizing, the union was uniquely prepared.145  As The New York Times reported, 
“by the time the July 31 strike deadline approached, the Teamsters had turned their UPS 
                                                 
141 Id. at 211-12. 
142 Id. at 216. 
143 See id. at 217. 
144 See Nathan Newman, Why the Victory at UPS Matters, CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH, Aug. 1997, http://www.nathannewman.org/other/why_ups_strike_matters.html. 
145 See Steven Greenhouse, Yearlong Effort Key to Success for Teamsters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 
1997, at A1 (“Though it was four months before their contract expired, four months before a 
strike deadline, these workers in Saddle Brook, like those rallies in 30 other cities around the 
country that morning, were already gung-ho volunteers in the teamsters’ efforts to mobilize 
members to stand up to U.P.S…The teamsters yearlong mobilization included scores of rallies at 
U.P.S. sites as well as other major efforts, like sending questionnaires to 185,000 teamsters 
asking what they wanted from the U.P.S. negotiations and collecting 100,000 signatures backing 
the union’s demands.  But the union did not neglect minor details: at one point, it distributed 
50,000 whistles for use at the rallies.”). 
 30
membership into a Juggernaut that the company’s executives underestimated.”146  Indeed, 
ninety-five percent of the workers voted to strike, and only a few thousand workers crossed the 
picket lines.147  The result was a resounding labor triumph, the first in many years.148  UPS 
agreed to transform ten thousand part-time jobs into full-time positions, to raise part-time starting 
pay for the first time in fifteen years, and to discard a major pension change the union had 
strongly opposed.149  In return, the union acceded only to the company’s desire for a five-year 
collective bargaining agreement.150    
For the UPS Teamsters, an ingrained practice of member activism, cultivating a tradition 
of cooperation and cohesion shaped the union into a formidable collective force.  But 
fundamentally, an established union is a bureaucracy, and it is reasonable to question if a 
constant undercurrent of collective activism is possible, or even desirable.151 
Is Sustained Internal Activism Possible? 
It is possible.  As Linda Markowitz notes at the conclusion of her study, activism within a 
bureaucracy requires skills different from those applicable to a strategic social movement.152   
Thus, activists must be taught not only how to win a campaign, but how to properly orient a 
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union so that energies are seamlessly transferred to more bureaucratic yet equally critical 
tasks.153    
For unions, proper orientation seems to embody two components, both previously 
intimated.  One, face-to-face interaction must be conceived not as a burdensome administrative 
task or just another union picnic, but as continuing opportunity for relationship renewal and 
member activation.  Sociologist Steven Lopez, for instance, describes a union’s successful 
efforts to survive after the company had unilaterally suspended dues deductions this way:  
“If dues could not be collected, the union would appear in an important sense to 
have ceased to exist.  But instead of lamenting the lack of dues deduction, the 
union viewed collecting dues one on one as an opportunity for continuing the 
face-to-face interaction that kept it together during the darkest days of the [initial 
organizing] struggle.”154   
 
Two, an incessant current of activism requires a constant simmering of minor conflict.  
Having examined the interaction between union culture and worker mobilization, sociologist 
Rick Fantasia notes that “cultures of solidarity are formed out of friction and opposition itself.  
That is, solidarity is to a considerable degree formed and intensified in interaction with the 
opposition.”155  Fantasia does not promote unbridled or open antagonism.  Rather, he hints at a 
crucial element of sustained union vigor: the urgent awareness that left unchecked, the workplace 
naturally tends against workers’ safety, rights, and freedom.  In turn, a union bureaucracy that 
enables activism ensures that workers both identify employer coercion and understand that 
struggles do not cease with certification and a contract, nor might they ever.156  Lopez, for 
instance, describes a union that established a twenty-four hour hotline for workers to report 
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unfair labor practices or OSHA violations.157  Once leaders encouraged its use, the system 
ensured that the employer’s potential to infringe rights remained central in workers’ minds,158  
promoting an everyday friction Fantasia would argue stokes solidarity and action.    
The right-to-work environment may produce a similar effect.  As right-to-work pressures 
union officials to dramatize the services they provide to justify dues, 159 they may implicitly (or 
explicitly) project an “us versus them” oppositional framework.  Workers, in turn, may slowly 
internalize this mentality, cementing an atmosphere of slight but omnipresent tension. 
 More critically, right-to-work begs a perpetual, internal union question: “Why should I 
pay dues?”  While the answer to this question is important, the act of answering is more so; 
participation in the “community of reason-givers” begins where the union official crafts a 
thoughtful, reasoned response.  The community is sustained when the question arises again and 
again across many actors.  It is this repetitive back and forth exchange, Stout and other radical 
democrats would assert, that is the very engine of mobilization.  
Is Sustained Internal Activism Desirable? 
A sustained current of intra-union activism is not just possible, it is also desirable.   Some 
historical, theoretical, and narrative evidence in support of that desirability has already been 
recounted, but a broader explanation remains, one that suggests an exotic quality of collective 
action:  It is infectious.  Put differently, it is through the experience of collective action that 
workers are stimulated and transformed.  As Fantasia maintains: “[I]n collective action . . . 
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something new is created . . .[a]n emergent culture is created in which new values are incubated, 
new forms of activity generated, and an associational bond of a new type formed.”160   
This phenomenon is apparent in Fantasia’s participation in and anatomy of two wildcat 
strikes at a small New Jersey iron foundry, Taylor Casting.  Using a meticulously catalogued 
first-person narrative, Fantasia shows how the shape of the second strike was a largely a 
“function of the process manifested in the first.”161  That is, in the later strike workers appeared 
not only to have learned from the first action, some were concretely transformed by it.  Indeed, 
Fantasia cites how in the second strike workers committed to solidarity not spontaneously, as in 
the first strike, but the day before the action occurred, how only before the second strike did 
workers think to secure tentative solidarity commitments from workers in areas of the factory not 
directly affected by the primary grievance, and how workers planned to coordinate their dress on 
the morning of the second strike as evidence of maturing collective tactics gained through 
experience.162  Moreover, new leaders emerged and solidarity was achieved more quickly in the 
second strike.  The four workers who catalyzed the second action were enthusiastic participants 
but not instigators of the first strike; by January they were ready to embrace leadership roles.163  
Fantasia hints at deep relational implications of this transformative experience:  
“Two of them worked closely together on a daily basis (as inspectors), but the 
other two (a welder and a heat-treatment furnace operator) worked at opposite 
ends of the department and had previously had little contact with each other.  
Race and ethnicity were not binding elements; two of the workers were black, one 
white, and the other Hispanic.”164 
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Fantasia’s analysis of the two strikes adds credence to the hypothesis that shop-floor 
relational banter, which was embedded in the Taylor employment experience as workers 
interacted with one another constantly throughout the day, can lead to an incipient solidarity.  At 
Taylor, this came to be expressed on two otherwise ordinary mornings as overt activism.  
Through an organic process of interrelation, an ad hoc leadership hierarchy took shape and 
activist energy swelled among the broader workforce, ready for release.   
 Of course, relational organizing at Taylor Casting should not have arisen organically.  It 
should not have been merely a fortuitous byproduct of workers’ arrangement on the factory 
floor.  It should have been planned, practiced, and promoted by union leadership. Though 
effective, the strikes highlighted a drastic disconnect between the union’s formal and informal 
leadership,165 a ripe target for future exploitation by management.  They were also illegal.   
Alternatively, had the official union leadership been committed to internal relational 
organizing in the months and years prior to the first wildcat, solidarity and energy would have 
still resulted, but it could have been harnessed strategically toward methodic collectivism 
practiced within the bounds of the collective bargaining agreement.  As this article has sought to 
argue, the introduction of nationalized right-to-work, combined with a union movement primed 
to take advantage of what that environment requires relationally for unions to thrive, might 
institutionalize this scenario.  When right-to-work is viewed as an opportunity, not an albatross, 
the resulting practices double as intensive preparation for collective action. 
CONCLUSION 
 The “grand bargain” cannot be separated from its two underlying idealisms.  First, 
workers who want to form a union community should not have to weigh incredible odds, a 
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bulwark of legal impediments, and the possibility of personal financial destruction before they 
even begin.  And second, true community leaves no room for involuntary members.   
But today, in states with union security, labor law facilitates the reverse:  The campaign 
is hellish, but later, membership is guaranteed.  And in right-to-work states, labor law is simply 
punitive: The campaign is hellish, and later, membership may evaporate.   
The grand bargain reworks both scenarios, presuming that the toughest union work 
should be reserved not for the beginning of a campaign, but after its conclusion.  Prior to 
recognition, a worker should face a single choice, unfettered and without anxiety: “To sign or not 
to sign?”  After recognition, a worker should face hundreds of difficult choices: “How on earth 
am I going to arrange all of these relational meetings?”  In Beloved Community, Charles Marsh 
denotes this latter struggle, which also confronted the civil rights movement, as the “more 
difficult work” of sustaining that follows the merely “difficult work”166 of creating: “the daily 
disciplines and sacrifices required to sustain beloved community . . .begin . . .in a whole lot of 
waiting around for car rides, in tedious organizational meetings and arguments about strategy, 
around the mimeograph machine.”167   
A union’s “more difficult work” encompasses Marsh’s talk of car-pooling and copying, 
but also the ribaldry of a buzzing union hall and its constituent parts: the scribbled events 
calendar, the old confetti lodged in a matted carpet that could use a good steam-cleaning, the 
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concrete walls adorned with memories of events and people past, and the ever-evolving phone-
tree.168  Through it all, the essence of union community is revealed. 
Of course, such “work” does not come naturally to all unions.  But just as Stout believes 
accountable relationships can cure a political culture that cultivates bad democrats, so too might 
they cure a union culture that cultivates bad unionists.  When properly conceived, a prime 
incubator for such relationships may be the right-to-work environment.  Proving that has been 
the primary challenge of this Article.   
 Rick Fantasia’s conclusion that “the character of the labor movement is crucial in shaping 
the content and shape of collective action by workers”169 is not rhetorical filling.  It is a 
challenge, one that summons a slew of simple diagnostic questions: How many relational 
meetings are automatically scheduled for new hires?; Which and how many committees are they  
expected to join?; What are their responsibilities in the union hall?; If  the union across town 
strikes, how many extra meals should be prepared for the strikers’ families? 
Organized workers can pursue better wages, better benefits, more fairness, and more 
dignity, but to actually be effective as a union, they must pursue internal, relational, community. 
The questions above simply point to some natural expectations of a functioning relational 
community.  In such an environment, that a worker could technically “opt-out” of the community 
is not a relevant consideration.  There will be as many reasons as there are relationships not to. 
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